Games - Median Voter Theory

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	Games - Median Voter Theory

Median voter theory, also known as the median voter theorem and the median voter model, is a famous voting model positing that in a majority election, if voters can all be represented along one dimension (i.e., if every voter's political type can be pinpointed on a line), then politicians seeking to win the election will realize that the pivotal voter required to win the election is that voter who lies at the median (middle) of the voter distribution. This is supposed to explain why in a two-party system, candidates often end up looking strikingly similar — they both have to pitch their platform to try to win the same median voter.

further identifies two versions of the median voter theorem: a weak form which says that the median voter "casts his or her vote for the policy that is adopted," and a strong form, which states that the median voter "always gets her most preferred policy." (Congleton, 2002).

According to this theory, a candidate would label his or her opponent as "too far from center" while choosing a label for his or her own style that evokes values or emotions that will appeal to the largest section of voters. If a poll shows that a candidate is behind, that candidate may respond by attempting to become more like the opposition in order to gain more votes from the opponent's side of the spectrum.

History of Median Voter Theory

The theorem was first articulated in Duncan Black's 1948 article, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making" and popularized by Anthony Downs's 1957 book, An Economic Theory of Democracy. Earlier thinkers such as Condorcet and Harold Hotelling hinted at similar formulations but did not receive widespread recognition for the identification of this simple idea that is nonetheless easily observed in modern elections. (Congleton, 2002).

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